Ontological Dividuation

By The Eudemian

What causes ontological dividuation? Let’s explore it.

There’s seven kinds of distinctions:

Being a valid distinction does not necessitate that it is a principle of dividuation, so we must examine each to determine which can cause a real distinction within or between entities.

Existential Distinctions

First, there are existential distinctions: a distinction of two beings solely in virtue of something pertaining to their property of existence. We can think of this in three fundamental ways: type, bareness, and signature. By type, I mean any sort of distinction in kind of existence (e.g., a mental vs. physical substrate in substance dualism); by bareness, I mean any sort of distinction which arises out of the ’nature’ of generic existence considered by-itself as a property but not an entity (viz., not an essent); and by signature, I mean any distinction by way of the means of existential confernment.

In terms of types of existence, there can only be one, generic type. If there were two or more (such as the mental and physical), then there immediately stands firm the hard problem of interaction; and it would defy the very definition of existence. So type cannot be a valid form of differentiation.

In terms of distinction in bareness of existence, ’to be’ is so simple of an attribution that it allows for nothing else to be said of it: there’s not further room for other sub-properties of this property to distinction amongst itself. So, too, the bare existence itself cannot differentiate.

In terms of the signature, there are three sub-types; namely, origin and destination. The origin refers to the source of the existential confernment; and the destination refers to the object receiving it. For example, think of a balloon as the object receiving existence and the existence being the air filling it up: the origin of the air filling it up could be an air pumping machine, and the object receiving that air is the balloon. Only once the balloon is fully filled with air is it fully realized as a balloon; and yet the balloon contains the fullness of its capacity to be a balloon in its own material as a balloon (despite it needing air). The fullness of the essence is present for the object in its form, but it must be fully given existence to be complete in existence (and for materially entities that means being received by matter most appropriately). Now, by analogy, we can see that the origin of existence cannot itself necessitate an ontologically distinction in the object receiving it: the balloon could be filled with air by two different air machines hooked up to it at once, making them co-facilitators of its realization. The destination, on the other hand, would always necessitate two differing objects, but only by definition as a prerequisite: if there are two different balloons receiving air from one air pump simultaneously, then obviously there are two different objects receiving it. However, the existence the balloons have, or are receiving, did not itself cause the ontological differentiation: the two different balloons were presuppposed in the first place to distinguish the destination.

Formal Distinctions

Second, we have formal distinctions, which is any distinction in form. E.g., the rationality vs. animality in my human nature is formally distinct despite being inseparable in existence within my form. This can lead some, such as in Scotism, to propose a third category from virtuality and reality called ‘formality’; whereby the distinction in a form is distinction not merely in our own understanding of the entity nor a distinction that causes separation. The issue is that it only distinguishes within the form itself and so the dilemma is merely pushed back a step. If the form itself is without parts, then the formal distinctions are virtual distinctions; or, if the form itself has parts corresponding to the formal distinctions, then the formal distinctions are real distinctions. This leaves no possibility the form for a third category of distinctions.

Now, the form is, indeed, without parts, because it is the act which is the entity’s intelligibility; so, e.g., the animality and rationality in my nature as a human male is two aspects of the same very act which constitutes my substantial form. Thusly, animality vs. rationality is a virtual distinction in my form.

On the other hand, I could also posit a type of formal distinction which is between forms as opposed to within a form; e.g., my substantial form vs. Socrate’s substantial form, or an elephant’s substantial form vs. the form of a chair. I could posit that, although formal distinctions within a form are virtual, the forms could be distinct from each other by type or instantiation in substance. This is a real kind of dividuation.

Material Distinctions

Thirdly, for material entities, I may posit matter as a principle of dividuation because matter can only receive one form and, thusly, if there is separate matter then there must be separate forms. However, matter can be operated on by more than one form (act). For example, Siamese Twins can share a large amount of matter and still survive despite the matter imperfectly receiving both of their forms. Likewise, in principle, there could be one body with one brain, heart, etc. which is operated harmoneously by two forms such that each form acts upon the matter in unison and in the same manner: thusly, it is possible for two forms to perfectly be received by the exact same matter.

However, matter is a principle of dividuation in terms of distinct matter requiring distinct forms from each other. The form cannot act on two distinct isntances of matter. Thusly, as Aquinas rightly points out, without ’that which can receive form’ (i.e., matter) there can be no principle of dividuation in substance and form of the same type because they are identical in existence to each other per se.

Partial Distinctions

Fourthly, a distinction in parts could differentiate if one entity has lacking the part(s) that another has. For example, a car cannot be a flower because it necessarily lacks the organic matter required. On the flip side, having the same parts cannot imply complete sameness (as noted before); because the same matter could be operated upon by two of the same type of form if the forms were in harmony, and, e.g., Siamese Twins share parts and are distinct in persons.

Relation Distinctions

Fifthly, a relation between two entities is a real relation and distinction; but it cannot itself cause dividuation because it is, by definition, just a signifier towards something. In the case that the signifier is towards something else, that presupposes ontological differentiation as opposed to causing it (just like the existential signature of destination); and in the case that the signifier is towards itself, it still presupposes the object itself as real. A relation is real IFF it signifies between an entity and an entity (even if it is the same entity) as opposed to a non-entity being and a non-entity being; e.g., the domino hitting another domino vs. the apple and horse being distinct in my dream. However, this signification does not entail distinction: it is between distinctions.

Substantial Distinctions

Sixthly, a distinction in substance may be posited; such as by type, an existential signature, etc. However, these all fail for reasons already described once we understand that the substance is intimately related to the form: the form is subsisting in and of the substance which bears it. There is one instance of a substance per form, and without ’that which receives the form’ (viz., matter) there is nothing which would make this instance of substance a distinct bearer over another.

Supposital Distinctions

Lastly, we have a distinction in supposita: a distinction between unique completions of a substance. This, by definition, would have to be a principle of dividuation; because a completion of a substance is a unique totality of it. If Socrates and Plato are completions of a human substance (even if it were the same concrete substance), then they must be two distinct entities in reality as totalities.

A suppositum is always caused by an the nature of a creative act of thought; whether that be in pure act (by God) or in a limited act (by a creature). For example, as a material existent, we can only educe the form out of matter but in accord with our object of thought which we are trying to realize with an act. When I educe the form of a chair by building one out of wood, I am priming the wood to receive the form which I will cause to be from my own object of thought (which is the chair). This object of thought contains the completion of the chair which is the subject of my own thought. In the case that the chair (which is my subject of thought) already exists and I am trying to create it again, my creation attempt would necessarily fail because I cannot educe what has already been educed from matter. Likewise, when I create a new chair, it is in the nature of my mind to have one subject of thought being created. Thusly, ordinarily a concrete substance cannot have more than one suppositum.

However, a pure act by God does not educe out of matter like we do: it is the pure confernment of existence that infuses-not educes. Consequently, although God’s subject of thought in any creation would have only one suppositum as the complete subject of it, it would be possible that God’s pure act upon an already existent entity could cause more than suppositum for the same concrete substance (such as Himself in the Trinity or an existent being thought of twice by God). In this case, it is not only possible but necessary: if God acts on an entity which already is fully realized at its essence in esse, then God, as pure act, cannot fail to confer the subject of His attempted creation upon it (thusly causing another suppositum) despite the entity existentially absorbing the existential confernment of substance.

Putting it all Together

From this, we can note some important things.

The valid principles of dividuation are differences in the (1) type of form, (2) instance of matter, (3) suppositum of the substance, and (4) differing parts.
Immaterial existents can only be different in form/substance or parts. Since all of them have only the distinction in parts between esse and essence (since they lack matter but are not pure act), they differ from God, as pure act, by way of God lacking those two parts and they differ from each other only by suppositum or type of form. Moreover, there could be, however, one instance of a type of immaterial substance which has multiple supposita from a pure act of God.
Material existents can only be different in form/substance, parts, or matter. E.g., Socrates is not this cat because he has a different form; Socrates is not Plato because he is in differing matter; and the car cannot be this tree because it lacks organic parts.
Two instances of the Divine Substance could not coexist because they do not differ in form, parts, or matter. Only a differentiation in supposita would be possible.